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Quantifying Audit Quality:  A Proposal Inspired by Recent  Initiatives   
                                                
Abstract 
 
 
 
Audit quality has gained intensive attention since the cascade of audit failures in 
the concluding years of the last century and the first few years of our new 
century.   The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 [hereafter identified as the Act] 
introduced a new oversight strategy to enhance the quality of audits.  To assure 
the performance of quality audits, the PCAOB was charged with responsibility for 
inspecting registered public accounting firms that perform financial audits for 
publicly-owned companies in the United States.   To date, however, this process 
has not resulted in measurement of audit quality. 
 
Since 2002, there have been two additional significant initiatives related to audit 
quality.  One was the Federal Government’s Single Audit Sampling Project which 
was reported in 2007;  the other, the establishment of the Center for Audit 
Quality, as an affiliate of the American Institute of CPA (AICPA) in early 2007.  
    
From a reading of these three initiatives, it was evident that while each makes a 
contribution none is sufficient to determine audit quality of publicly owned 
entities.   This paper includes a review of these initiatives, as well as a general  
structure for undertaking an objective statistical study to measure audit quality.  
The task is feasible, but will require several years of well designed efforts.        
 
 The development of criteria and of their measurement is not a one-step research 
effort.  Several years of experience of data gathering and careful statistical 
testing are necessary.  Over time, criteria identified must be tested for reliability 
and validity.   
 
The initial years of efforts at objective measurement should be considered 
experimental;  such efforts will not result in ranking or rating particular accounting 
firms.  Only after validity and reliability of measurement are assured will there be 
a basis for measurement of individual firms.    
 
 
 
(Note:  An earlier draft of this Working Paper was presented at a session of the  
American Accounting Association:  Mid-Atlantic Region Meeting April 24-26, 2008, Hyatt 
Regency Hotel, Penn’s Landing, Philadelphia, PA). 
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Quantifying Audit Quality:  A Proposal Inspired by Recent  Initiatives   
 
 
Audit quality has gained intensive attention since the cascade of audit failures in 
the concluding years of the last century and the first few years of the new 
century.   The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 [hereafter identified as the Act] 
introduced a new oversight strategy to enhance the quality of audits.  To assure 
the performance of quality audits, the PCAOB was charged with responsibility for 
inspecting registered public accounting firms who perform financial audits for 
publicly-owned companies in the United States.  To date this process has not 
resulted in measurement of audit quality.    
 
Since 2002, there have been two additional significant initiatives related to  
quality.  One was the Federal Government’s Single Audit Sampling Project; the 
other, the establishment of the Center for Audit Quality (CAQ), as an affiliate of 
the American Institute of CPA (AICPA).  
 
Audit quality must be quantified to provide valid and reliable judgments.  To date 
there are no fully developed objective criteria for audit quality.  While the three 
initiatives above identified have promising goals, none is sufficient for measuring 
audit quality.  The need for measurement is clearly reflected in the goal of the 
PCAOB; the feasibility is implied in the design of the Federal Government Single 
Audit Sampling project and: significance is reflected in the activities of the CAQ.  
 
There needs to be a comprehensive statistically-based project that can not be 
concluded in a year.  Several years of careful study are required.  The population 
would be registered firms who audit publicly-owned companies in the United 
States.  In the initial years of the proposed project, the findings should be 
considered tentative, as criteria must be tested for reliability and validity.  
Ranking or rating individual firms will not be quickly established.  
 
 Outcomes for several years – possibly three to five -- would be reported to 
disclose progress and continuing problems in the quest for reliable and valid 
criteria.   It is not unreasonable to expect that as many as five years of such 
study of audit quality will be required before criteria for measurement are 
sufficiently valid and reliable for “scoring” the quality of audit performance in 
individual audit firms.   
 
This paper discusses the three initiatives and then introduces a brief, general 
presentation of a structure for study of audit quality.  The paper includes 
discussion of the following:  1..  The PCAOB inspection process; 2.  The Single 
Audit sampling project of  the President’s Commission on Performance and 
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Integrity; 3. The Center for Audit Quality; 4.  Clues – but not a model; 5.  A 
proposal for quantifying audit quality.   6. Some final comments  
 
1.  The PCAOB Inspection Process 
 
The responsibility for inspections is stated in the Act in these words: 
 
The board shall conduct a continuing program of inspections to assess the 
degree of compliance of each registered public accounting firm and 
associated persons of that firm with this Act, the rules of the Board, the 
rules of the Commission [SEC], or professional standards, in connection 
with its performance of audits, issuance of audit reports, and related 
matters involving issuers. (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Sec. 104, 
Inspections of Registered Public Accounting Firms, 13)  
 
1.1   PCAOB Chose a Supervisory Approach 
 
As implemented currently, the approach to responding to the requirement for 
inspections is reflected in what the Chairman noted in the Annual Report for 
2005: 
 
The inspection team takes a supervisory approach to oversight and seeks 
through constructive dialogue to encourage firms to improve their 
practices and procedures.  Every Board inspection that includes a quality 
control criticism alerts  the firm to the opportunity to prevent criticism from 
becoming public.  (PCAOB, Annual Report 2005, 9) 
 
During an inspection engagement there are discussions about problems 
identified.  Such discussions are held with members of the audit team, the firm’s 
staff member responsible .for the inspection, national office experts and 
managing partner or chief executive of the firm.  (for more discussion re 
inspection reports see PCAOB, Statement Concerning. . . ) 
 
1.2  Inspectors Do Not Determine Level of Audit Quality  
 
The supervisory approach does not provide a basis for determining overall audit 
quality of the firm inspected based on the public report provided for each 
inspection.   Decisions about choice of audits, topics to be the focus of the 
inspection, and the number of audits to be inspected appear to be made related   
to each public accounting firm under inspection.  Information about such 
decisions  are not disclosed in the inspection reports that are available to the 
public.   
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Each inspection report states the following: 
 
. . . the board cautions against drawing conclusions about the comparative 
merits of the annually inspected firms based on the number of reported 
deficiencies in any given year.  The total number of audits reviewed is a 
small portion of the total audits performed by these firms, and the 
frequency of deficiencies identified does not necessarily represent the 
frequency of deficiencies throughout the firm’s practice.    Moreover, if the 
Board discovers a potential weakness during an inspection, the Board 
may revise its inspection plan to target additional audits that may be 
affected by that weakness, and this may increase the number of 
deficiencies reported for that firm in that year.  (See any inspection report 
posted at PCAOB website)  
 
Notwithstanding the limitations of an inspection, the deficiencies noted do reflect 
failure to meet professional guidance in the particular audit inspected.   Left 
unanswered is the extent to which a deficiency is pervasive throughout the 
population of a firm’s yearly audits.  The reader, therefore,  of an inspection 
report has no basis for drawing conclusions based on deficiencies reported. 
 
1.3  Disclaimers Noted in Inspection Reports 
 
An introductory page for each inspection states clearly other limitations of the 
information provided in an inspection report.  Among the statements are these: 
 
Any references in this report to violations or potential violations of law, 
rules, or professional standards should be understood in the supervisory 
context in which this report is prepared. 
 
The Board. . has no authority to prescribe the form or content of an 
issuer’s financial statements.  That authority, and the authority to make 
binding determinations concerning an issuer’s compliance with GAAP or 
Commission disclosure requirements, rests with the Commission  
[Securities and Exchange Commission].  (See any Inspection Report 
posted at the PCAOB website) 
 
1.4    Contribution to Audit Quality Not Determinable 
 
At this point in the implementation of its oversight role, the PCAOB is not 
engaged in providing a conclusion about audit quality of an inspected registered 
public accounting firm or of inspected firms taken as a group.  The most recent 
report that discussed inspections was related to inspections in 2004, 2005, and 
2006 of domestic triennially inspected firms [Triennially inspected firms are small 
firms with fewer than 100 audit clients who report to the SEC].   The scope of the 
report was noted in the initial paragraph: 
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This report discusses areas of the audit where PCAOB inspectors have 
observed significant or frequent deficiencies in the first PCAOB 
inspections of triennial firms.  The descriptions are included in this report 
in order to alert triennial firms to areas where they could improve 
performance and to inform the public about certain inspection findings for 
triennial firms over the past three years.  (PCAOB, Report on the 
PCAOB’s 2004. . . ) 
 
In the Conclusion of this report the Board stated that it  “issued this report to 
highlight areas where firms can focus their attention to order to enhance the 
quality of their audits.”   Readers were reminded, though, that the deficiencies 
noted are not the only areas requiring attention.  Each firm should, “in the course 
of monitoring its own audit performance, identify and address any specific 
impediments to compliance with PCAOB standards.” 
 
The earlier noted supervisory nature of the inspection process is reflected in the 
Report here cited.  There is implied that firms can enhance audit quality by noting 
the deficiencies described in this summary report and by also monitoring audits. 
The Report noted that “many triennial firms have informed the Board’s inspection 
staff that they have instituted improvements in their audit processes after dialog 
with PCAOB inspectors.   There is no comment that such assertions were 
objectively verified by the inspectors. 
 
There is no information about audit quality as a result of the inspection process.  
Furthermore, it is not clear how the inspection process as currently implemented 
is meeting the requirement noted earlier in Section 104 of the Act which refers “to 
assess the degree of compliance. . . . “. 
 
2. The National Single Audit Sampling Project 
 
In 2002 during a U. S. House of Representatives hearing about the importance of 
single audits and their quality, the Controller at the time testified that “several 
Federal agencies had disclosed deficiencies as a result of single audits.”  Also 
noted among findings were: 
 
In single audits, auditors did not perform adequate tests and, in some   
cases, gathered no evidence through tests of compliance requirements; 
and Quality Control Reviews (QCRs) by another large agency found a 
high percentage of audits in which adequate testing had not been 
performed. 
 
Yet, such information about some audits was not deemed sufficient to know 
exactly what was the situation as related to audit quality.   The  Comptroller 
noted:   
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The selection of audits for review was not statistically-based and that a 
statistically-based measure of audit quality was needed. 
 
Each year the Federal Government provides billions of dollars of Federal funds to 
state and local government entities and to non-profit organizations.  In 2007, the 
total funds provided to state and local governments were $449 billions.  The 
Single Audit Act of 1984 (and Single Audit Act Amendments of 1996) established 
a requirement for annual audits of non-Federal recipients and subrecipients. 
It was clear at the 2002 hearing that something more was needed to determine  
audit quality of single audits.  
 
2.1  The Project’s Leadership 
 
The Audit Committee of the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency 
(PCIE) was the overall body responsible for the Project, which was a 
collaborative effort.  Involved were PCIE member organizations, as well as a 
member of the Executive Council of Integrity and Efficiency (ECIE), and three 
State Auditors.   
 
The coordination needed to determine the quality of single audits using statistical 
methods and to make recommendations to address noted audit quality issues. 
In the covering letter of the Chair, PCIE Audit Committee, is reflected in the 
following note:   
 
By agreement with Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the 
other participants, the U. S. Department of Education, Office of Inspector 
General, coordinated the administration of the Project, and prepared the 
Project report. 
    .  
2.2  Scope of the Statistical Study 
 
The scope of the Quality Control Reviews (QCRs) included the fieldwork and 
reporting related to internal control over compliance with laws and regulations for 
selected major Federal programs.   The Project QCRs did not review the  audit 
work related to general-purpose financial statements, the correctness of the 
auditor’s opinion on such statements, or the auditors’ consideration of internal 
control over financial reporting.   
 
QCRs were performed for 208 single audits randomly selected from a stratified 
universe of all single audits for the one-year period from April 1, 2003 through 
March 31, 2004.  These 208 audits were selected from the 38,000 audits in the 
specified population.  The sample was split into two strata, with Stratum I 
including audits of entities that expended $50 million or more of Federal funds. 
Stratum II included audits of entities that were recipients of at least $500,000, but 
less than $50 million. 
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The assessment of audit quality was based on the extent to which the auditee 
conformed to applicable requirements, standards and procedures.  OMB Circular 
A-133 sets forth requirements that are to be reflected in the documentation for 
audits.  Criteria were developed related to the requirements.  The categories 
established by the Project personnel were:   
 
             Group:                                      Category: 
 
     Acceptable                                  Acceptable; accepted with Deficiencies 
     Limited Reliability                         Significant Deficiencies 
     Unacceptable                               Material Reporting Errors 
                                                          Substandard                                                                        
 
In determining single audit quality statistical sampling was used to estimate audit 
qualify for the universe and for each of the two strata.  Each audit within a 
stratum had equal chance of being selected for review and in projecting results; 
each audit was given equal weight.   
 
(While the results are very interesting, this paper deals with the process; 
therefore, the results are not discussed.  ( see President’s Council on Integrity 
and Efficiency, Report on National Single Audit. . . ) 
 
2.3  The Value of a Statistical Sampling Approach 
 
Franzel, Director, Financial Management and Assurance, United States 
Government Accountability Office discussed the Project before a Senate 
Subcommittee.   She noted: 
 
During the 1980s, GAO issued reports that identified concerns with single 
audit quality, including issues with insufficient  evidence related to audit 
planning, internal control and compliance testing, and the auditor’s 
adherence to Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards 
(GAGAS).  The federal Inspectors General as well have found similar 
problems with single audit quality.  The deficiencies we cited during the 
1980s were similar in nature to those identified in the recent PCIE report.  
(GAO, Single Audit Quality, 7) 
 
In her comments, Franzel noted: 
 
In our view, the current status of single audit quality is unacceptable.  We 
are concerned that audits are not being conducted in accordance with 
professional standards and requirements.  These audits may provide a 
false sense of assurance and could mislead users of audit reports 
regarding issues of compliance and internal control over federal programs.  
(GAO, Single Audit Quality, 13) 
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The PCIE report presents compelling evidence that a serious shortfall in 
the quality of single audits continues to exist.  (GAO, Single Audit Quality, 
18) 
 
In her testimony, Franzel noted that the audit quality problems noted in the 
statistical study were similar to such problems in prior reports.  For example, she 
referred to reports from December 1985 and March 1986 that stated  “auditors 
performing single audits frequently did not satisfactorily comply with professional 
auditing standards.”  (GAO, Single Audit Quality, 12) 
 
The evidence from the statistical study provides a baseline of “current status” and 
at the same time provides a means of monitoring quality in the future.  Franzel’s 
testimony moves beyond the findings of the study itself to note the types of 
revisions that need to be considered for guidance provided.  Furthermore, she 
commented on how the disciplinary process to date had failed to meet 
expectations for dealing with auditors who have failed to meet their professional 
responsibilities. 
 
2.4  Contribution to Audit Quality of the National Single Audit Sampling Project   
 
The U. S. General Accountability Office (GAO)’s testimony presented on audit 
quality (October 25, 2007) by Franzel reveals the level of assurance provided 
from conclusions based on a statistically based investigation.   That factor – level 
of assurance – is totally lacking in the actions to date of the PCAOB.  The  
silence about any type of evaluation of the PCAOB’s supervisory efforts for the 
first three years of full inspections means  there is no basis to date to make a 
judgment about the interpretative wisdom of the PCAOB’s  inspections. 
 
The key contribution of the efforts of the President’s Council on Integrity and 
Efficiency and the Executive Council on Integrity and Efficiency is a profound, 
fundamental observation:   Only a statistical study provides sufficiently valid 
information for policy decisions that will enhance audit quality.   
 
Additionally, the findings contribute guidance for  policy decisions as we as to 
educational/learning needs, and the determination of appropriate sanctions for 
failure to meet requirements.  While there are useful conclusions for those who 
perform all types of audits, the study was related only to certain components of 
Federal Government Single Audits. 
 
3.  The Center for Audit Quality 
 
The Center for Audit Quality began functioning as of January 2007.  The 
motivation for creation is noted at the website as:   
The Center for Audit Quality was created to serve investors, public 
company auditors and the markets. The Center’s mission is to foster 
confidence in the audit process and to aid investors and the capital 
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markets by advancing constructive suggestions for change rooted in the 
profession’s core values of integrity, objectivity, honesty and trust. 
Note that the foregoing does not include the word quality.  The Center is a 
nonpartisan, not-for-profit entity that acknowledges that it will conform to all legal 
requirements for disclosure of its activities. 
To accomplish this mission, the Center will work:   
to make public company audits even more reliable and relevant for  
investors in a time of growing financial complexity and market 
globalization. It will also undertake research, offer recommendations to 
enhance investor confidence and the vitality of the capital markets, issue 
technical support for public company auditing professionals, and help 
facilitate the public discussion about modernizing business reporting. 
3.1  The Structure of Center for Audit Quality 
As noted earlier, the Center for Audit Quality is affiliated with the American 
Institute of CPAs.   The Center is autonomous with a governing board and is 
supported by its member firms.  
U.S. accounting firms that are members of the American Institute of CPAs are 
eligible for membership in the Center for Audit Quality at some level.  U.S. 
accounting firms that have registered with the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB) are also eligible for membership.   U.S. accounting 
firms not registered with the PCAOB are eligible for associate membership.   
Non-U.S. firms, while ineligible for membership, are able to subscribe to certain 
materials issued by the Center. 
A Governing Board with leaders from public company auditing firms, AICPA, and 
the representatives from investor and issuer communities oversee the activities 
of the Center.  The Board establishes committees, advisory groups for identified 
matters, and task forces needed to fulfill the mission of the Center. 
There is an executive director who is responsible for leading the Center’s 
operations.  The executive director reports to the Governing Board.  
No information is provided at the website about the number of members or the 
membership of committees,  
3.2  How Center for Audit Quality Perceives Its Role 
The following is from one response (at the Center’s Website) to the question, 
How is the CAQ different from other organizations related to accountancy and 
auditing? 
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The Center for Audit Quality represents the first time that public company 
auditors, as a group, have joined with public leaders in the investor and 
corporate communities to discuss the issues facing the capital markets, 
conduct research on these topics and ultimately make recommendations 
that will foster confidence in the capital markets. . ..  (Website:  ww.thecaq.org) 
The Center for Audit Quality is an advocate for the auditing profession.  Its efforts 
are not driven by objectivity.  In a comment letter sent to the Advisory Committee 
on the Auditing Profession, Office of Financial Institutions Policy on November 
30, 2007,  was the following:     
The PCAOB inspections are designed to determine [bold added for 
emphasis] the extent to which audit firms have, and adhere to, adequate 
quality control policies and procedures that address all significant aspects 
of public company auditing, as well as the effectiveness of performance on 
specific audit engagements.  The PCAOB’s regulatory oversight and 
ability to access comprehensive information about audit firms helps to 
ensure investor confidence in the quality and independence of the firms.   . 
. . . In the final analysis, investors can trust that a regulator is deeply 
involved and committed to our audit quality.  [bold added for 
emphasis]   
The bolded phrase and sentence are vague; they fail to communicate exactly 
what is being achieved by the PCAOB as perceived by the CAQ.   Disclaimers in 
inspection reports imply that there may not be support for what the CAQ declares 
as designed.  (see page 5 of this paper).  One interpretation of the in the final 
analysis comment  could well be that since the PCAOB is an oversight group, 
you can assume  it is  driven by interest in audit quality.  Yet, the CAQ in 
assuring “that investors can trust,” without providing empirical evidence to 
support the conclusion.   
To date, there has been no public disclosures from the PCAOB of any criteria 
that measure  audit quality or that they are involved in objectively determining 
valid and reliable measures of audit quality. 
The Center, as noted earlier, is an advocate for those firms that audit publicly-
owned companies.  Such a Center can provide something of value.  The Center 
sponsored a Public Dialogue Tour.  Wise observations among panelists 
participating in the Tour, for example, may have provided insightful ideas that 
would merit objective study and investigation.  The nature of the outcomes of the 
Tour sessions and how they will be implemented  will provide clues as to the 
strategy this new Center for Audit Quality will pursue.   
3.3  Activities Undertaken by the Center 
During its first year, the Center initiated a public dialogue tour, celebrated the fifth 
anniversary of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and provided alerts to members, 
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comment letters related to regulatory matters, and met with regulatory groups.  
Just a few comments will be provided about the Public Dialogue Tour and alerts 
to members at this point: 
Public Dialogue Tour.  The description of this ten-city tour at the website noted 
that the purpose was: 
To discuss potential improvements to the quality, relevance and integrity 
of financial reporting.  We are visiting various regions of the country to 
hear directly from users of audited financial information and better learn 
how business reporting might evolve to meet the information needs of all 
types of investors. 
:Those participating are selected from leading regional issuers, investors, current 
and former regulators, government officials, and academics.  At the conclusion of 
the tour (meetings began in Denver, CO in April 2007 and concluded in 
Washington, DC in July 2008),  the Center announced that it would summarize 
and publicize the discussions held in the ten cities.  (In addition to the two 
named, there were meetings in Charlotte, NC,  Minneapolis, MN, Seattle, WA, 
New York, Chicago, IL, San Francisco, CA, Dallas, TX, and Boston, MA.) 
The goal in sponsoring these tours was to improve the audit process based on 
ideas presented and discussed by participants.  Recommendations will 
emphasize making company audits “more transparent, easier to understand and 
even more reliable.”   (See Website for a more complete discussion of the Public 
Dialogue Tour www.thecaq.org) 
Member Alerts.   Matters of interest to members are the subject of alerts that are 
provided from time to time.  However, those alerts that are considered broad-
based are posted for nonmembers to view.  Illustrative of the alerts listed for all 
accessing the website were:  Highlights of the Advisory Committee on the 
Auditing Profession’s Telephone Meeting (April 7, 2008) and CAQ issues White 
Paper on Illiquidity of the Markets (October 3, 2007).  
4.  Clues, But Not  a Model  
The foregoing three sections of this paper discussed briefly three  recent efforts 
to deal with audit quality.  As noted earlier, none is exactly a model for 
determining audit quality of registered firms that audit publicly-owned entities that 
report to the Securities and Exchange Commission yearly. 
Below are brief comments about each of the three initiatives:  : 
PCAOB Inspection Process:   The supervisory approach that begins with 
determining what audits will be selected and what aspects of audits selected will 
be inspected may indeed be highlighting the most vulnerable aspects of audits 
for the given year.  However, such a selection process, as a disclaimer clearly 
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identifies, does not provide a basis for making a judgment about the public 
accounting firm’s quality or for the total population of audits done by that firm in 
the given year or all audits done by all firms. 
 If there was a strict interpretation of the requirement as stated in Section 104, 
possibly, a measure of quality would be an immediate goal of the PCAOB.   As 
noted earlier, there is no information about the extent to which the inspection 
strategy, a supervisory approach, is perceived to be a short-term one or if what 
has been done during these early years will persist into the future.   
National Single Audit Sampling Project:  This project was unique in determining 
to measure audit quality for a total year’s population of a specific type of audit – 
the single audit.  Inasmuch as the effort was to determine the extent to which 
recipients and subrecipients of government funds were adhering to the internal 
control requirements and other compliance and regulatory requirements, there 
was not included any review of the general financial reporting that was a 
component of the audits reviewed. 
Any effort to measure audit quality for registered audit firms will find value in 
understanding in details of the strategy used for determining sample and for 
specifying the factors that were considered significant in “measuring” compliance. 
The Center for Audit Quality:   This Center has a membership of practitioners 
who are participating in committees, task forces, and in other ways that provide a 
valuable source for keen, insightful observations.  Additionally, events, including   
the Public Dialogue Tour,  bring together a broad group of key individuals with 
different points of view that also generate ideas worthy of exploration in an 
objective manner.  While the term audit quality is in the name, the term is missing 
in explanations of  what the Center does. 
These three initiatives have inspired the briefly discussed proposal in the next 
section. 
5.  A Proposal to Quantify Audit Quality 
The state of technology related to processing information makes it feasible to 
consider determining the quality of audits of publicly owned entities in the United 
States.  The task is not an easy one; however, it is a task that is feasible and that 
could result in  promising results in the quest to determine audit quality, not only 
for publicly-owned entities but for a wide range of private and not-for-profit 
entities who undergo audits by public accountants.  The task must begin with an 
experimental thrust.   
 
The ultimate goal to have criteria that provide a means of quantifying audit quality 
must meet rigorous standards of validity and reliability.  A well organized, 
successful designed project might be completed in five years.  
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5.1  Prerequisites 
 
There are a number of significant prerequisites.  These are briefly described: 
 
The Project’s Leadership:  The project will need to be under the direction of a 
totally objective body, possibly the PCAOB or the SEC.   
 
The Project’s Management:  A group of scientifically educated personnel who are 
uninfluenced by political or professional pressures is needed to design and carry 
through the research required.  This management team must be of impeccable 
character to assure complete confidentiality and objectivity throughout the life of 
the project.   The group must be able to gain the cooperation of many to 
participate in a variety of ways to accomplish the goals of such a project. 
 
 
The Goal of the Effort:   The ultimate goal of the project is to provide criteria that 
assure valid and reliable objective measurement of audit quality. An intermediate 
goal is to measure audit quality for the total population, for example, of audits 
performed in compliance with PCAOB requirements.  Finally, the project should 
conclude with criteria that support valid and reliable measuring of an individual 
firm’s audit quality.  Such objective assessments of individual firms will be helpful 
to the firms in reviewing – and redesigning  – their auditing policies and practices.     
 
The Impact on Firm Assessment:  The initial goal provides a macro quality 
measurement  that will be helpful to all firms whose audits are included in the 
population.  At this point, though, there will be no basis for making judgments 
about audit quality at the firm level.   
 
It is in the further investigations that relate to reliability and validity in relation to a 
single firm that will result in conclusions that will have meaning to individual firms. 
The driver of interest in such an effort is not the ranking and disclosure of firms’ 
performance; the driver of interest is objective encouragement of the reward of 
quality performance of every audit. 
 
5.2   The Initial Investigation 
 
The initial task that will require cooperative effort of many is determining 
operationally what are possible criteria for to measure audit quality.  The most 
insightful persons in the field of auditing – in practice offices throughout the 
country, in U. S. colleges and universities and in regulatory agencies   – should 
be called on to participate in an anonymous fashion to provide their judgments.    
Their input must be reviewed, tested and retested astutely and carefully to 
ultimately determine the final criteria for audit quality. There are likely to be 
several experimental trials of criteria tentatively selected.   This task will require 
patience. unrelenting objective review and wise interpretation for practical 
application to measuring the quality of performance of audits.   
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All information obtained from registered public accounting firms is secured so 
identification of specific firms is not possible.   All original data must be handled 
in an absolutely confidential manner.   
 
The design of the statistical sample must be determined.  The population will be 
all the audits performed in the specified period.   Given the industry 
specializations identified by public accounting firms, the sample should be a 
random stratified sample by major industry groups.   There are other possible 
strata that can be identified for insightful views of what is transpiring in the 
performance of audits. 
 
Possibly, audit samples for three years to five years will be considered useful for 
a macro view of audit quality as the refinement of criteria continues. All reports 
issued during the developmental stages will in no way identify individual firms.  
During this period, the PCAOB may continue to perform inspections, possibly, 
incorporating new strategies reflected in the project’s efforts that appropriate for 
experimental implementation. 
 
5.3 Beyond the Initial Investigation  
 
During the first three years -- and for possibly the two following years – attention 
will continue to be focused on determining what minimum combination of criteria 
is sufficiently valid and reliable to use for making judgments of audit quality in the 
total population of firms who perform audits as well as for individual firms..    
 
During the years of the audit quality measurement project , there may develop a 
more objective attitude toward what is actually happening as audits are 
performed.   (The leadership of the project may have talent in encouraging such 
an attitude)  Professional staff of registered firms may volunteer to be observant 
and reflective on the tasks they perform and share their observations with the 
project team.   
 
At the present time, reading and attempting to interpret the inspection reports 
raise questions.  For example, there are letters written to the PCAOB by 
inspected firms that state disagreements with deficiencies noted with the firm 
nothing that judgments vary, etc.  Such letters are not required in response to the 
receipt of an inspection report.  .  However, when Firms submit letters of 
comment,  they are included in the inspection report (with any proprietary or 
other confidential information deleted).   Yet, there is no disclosure about what is 
done about such letters.  Is ther a response?  If a Firm, for example, is noting 
disagreement with a conclusion of the inspectors, does the PCAOB engage in a 
discussion with the Firm?  Is there a resolution of the disagreement?  
 
How does the PCAOB, for example, report a second review which concludes 
with the dropping, let us say, of the deficiency because of the Firm’s defense?  
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There must be a possibility of making a judgment about which judgment – the 
PCAOB’s inspection team or the Firm – is better?  How often should the two 
judgments be a “toss up” – and one judgment is essentially as good as the other.  
In such a case, does the PCAOB accept the Firm’s judgment?  There is no 
disclosure of answers to such questions when effort was made to find such 
disclosures at the PCAOB Website. 
 
Judgments of professionally qualified auditors are anticipated to be in agreement, 
since there is professional guidance that provides a framework for making 
judgments.  If there are disagreements, in the majority of instances, differences 
can be resolved after a more careful reading and interpretation of the relevant 
guidance by those who initially disagreed..   Reasonable follow up with an effort 
at a  “meeting of the minds” as to which alternative represents best judgment 
generally leads to a satisfactory resolution.  Only in rare instances, is there no 
resolution of “what is the best answer.”     This assumption that judgments will 
ultimately be the same that is critical in believing that audit quality can indeed be 
determined objectively.   
6.  Some Final Comments 
 
Audit quality is indeed important in assuring credibility for auditor opinions.  
Quantifying audit quality is recommended as a worthwhile undertaking.  As 
noted, there are promising initiatives giving attention to audit quality.  However, 
the position presented in this paper is that none alone is sufficient.  A 
combination of the three, also, is not sufficient.      
 
6.1  The PCAOB Process 
 
The PCAOB’s inspection process may indeed be leading to improvement in the 
quality of audits.  That improvement is not measurable as a result of inspections 
which are supervisory in nature and do not follow a consistent strategy. To date,  
only deficiencies that rise to a certain level are disclosed in reports posted at the 
PCAOB’s website or discussed in reports of the PCAOB.  Presently,  there is no 
basis for making any judgment about audit quality for performance of audits of 
publicly-owned entities who are registered with the PCAOB.    Statements about 
the rigorous review by the PCAOB and that audit quality is improving are not 
supportable with valid evidence.   
 
6.2  Report about National Single Audit Study 
 
The June 2007 Report on National Single Audit Sampling Project and its review 
in Testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Federal Financial 
Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International 
Security, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U. S. 
Senate (October 25, 2007) are impressive documents.  They reflect a promising 
strategy.  They reveal the confidence attached to interpretations and 
recommendations based on statistically obtained and analyzed data. 
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6.3  The Center for Audit Quality Initiatives   
 
The initiatives of the Center for Audit Quality may be heightening attention to 
quality audits, but the position of advocacy does not assure the objectivity 
required to provide credibility to statements and announcements about financial 
statements of companies for which audits are performed.. Relying on opinion and 
astute public relations efforts to declare the quality of audits are not sufficient in 
an environment where information is available and technology provides 
capabilities that make analysis of audit results feasible. 
 
6.4  Time to Measure Audit Quality  
 
It is time to undertake the measurement of audit quality.  The task will not be 
completed in a year.  Several years of wisely designed, carefully performed 
statistical research studies will be needed.    Through such efforts, there will be 
developed criteria that result from reliability and validity tests sufficient to support 
the judgments about audit quality not only for the audited population as a whole, 
but for audits performed by a single firm.   The strategy for such an effort is 
merely sketched in brief comments here.  Further development is needed.  First, 
however, there must be genuine acceptance of the value of quantifying audit 
quality.   
 
The anticipated goal is one that is critically needed.  Firms performing audits with 
unrelenting commitment to quality that can be measured  will be a major 
breakthrough in the world of public accounting.   
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